One of the most puzzling matters for this blogger relates to the outright refusal by governments to learn the costly mistakes that have been made in drug control policies. This article, by Richard Norton-Taylor in the Guardian shows that in spite of the escalated efforts to eradicate the growth of opium poppy, Afghanistan will have a record harvest in this year. As the story acknowledges, farmers in Afghanistan now account for 92% of global illicit production of that crop and the record harvest represents a 49% growth over the preceding year.
This blogger finds it quite curious that the military objectives of defeating the Taliban and affiliated terrorists is being tied to the fight for the eradication of the opium poppy from Afghanistan. To my mind, the rationale for the consolidation of drug policy and security policy is quite wrong-headed and results in an unfair use of a capable military outfit. In the interest of the larger security goals, the separation of the drug control policy and the security policy will ensure that the British forces are deployed more meaningfully in Helmand Province and the rest of that country. Otherwise, the evidence suggests that the loss to the Taliban will eventually follow the increasingly apparent failure in controlling the opium crop.
Just before any further resources are dedicated to the war on Opium poppy in Afghanistan, it may help to be acquainted with this paper: The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs.
Fight the war that you can win. In other words, fight and beat the Taliban. That is the legitimate military target. This law and order approach is not the most beneficial way of facing the cultivation of opium poppy.
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