Nuclear NPT: In Search of New Paradigm

While the world was focused on the initiatives by the Islamic Republic of Iran to scale up uranium enrichment with the potential for the production of weapons grade material, North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test and reminds us all that we are juggling far too many balls. There have been predictable responses regarding the illegal move by North Korea but I wonder whether North Korea has not done it precisely because it is illegal. Being a rogue nation certainly ensures that one has international attention.

Two important questions come to this mind that is not thoroughly schooled in military affairs. The first one is whether North Korea really intends to maintain a set of military weapons with the intention to use them. Knowing Kim Jong Il, is it likely that he would be so daft as to try and attack while knowing that that such action would probably constitute the last executive action that he would take in North Korea? Judging from the actions that the leadership of North Korea is known for such as to overestimate the degree of control and influence that they may have on international affairs, the primary intent and timing of the test may be the result of different calculations and assumptions. Indeed, the North Korean establishment has communicated that it will abandon further development in return for reciprocation from the United States of America. At this point in time then, nuclear armaments or the threat of their attainment are a bargaining instrument.

The second question is informed by the fact that with the expectation of the Israeli bombardment of Osirak, there is no historical precedent of a nation that was successfully reversed once it took major steps towards being a nuclear power. As a matter of fact, the extremely brave tactical strike such as this one may not be entirely possible today. One may therefore ask, to what extent is the rest of the world determined to go to ensure that the North Korean Nuclear programme is permanently halted. More directly, the question asks what are the acceptable costs for maintaining the Non Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban in their current forms. My fear is that irrespective of the degree of danger posed by North Korea’s development of nuclear devices, the more appropriate approach demands the adoption of a different mind set altogether. I suspect that most nations, whether classified as rogue state or not, would ultimately cobble together a nuclear device of some kind or other notwithstanding the best endeavors of the international community.

Scary as the implications of this may be, I do not foresee the CBT and Non Proliferation Treaty maintaining their present character within the next two decades while still successfully holding constant the number of nuclear weapon capable states at the current number. Presently, the prestige and respect that nations gain from cheating their way into the circle makes even clumsy attempts at attaining nuclear power status irresistible for desperate dictatorships.

The condemnations aside, background thinking on developing unambiguous symbols to communicate the costs that would be attendant to either use or transfer of nuclear weapons material to non-state combatants is worthy of pursuit. The determination of North Korea and other non-democratic states to acquire nuclear devices suggests that browbeating them will not work for long. The real danger lies in the fact that there will certainly be a panic among its neighbors with the consequence that there will be a real arms race in the region.

A new paradigm for regulating entry into the nuclear weapons capable nations club is required. Otherwise, the international community or whatever is left of it will continue to juggle many balls with the increasing possibility that one may drop.